U.S. Weapons Rebuild Hinges on China's Control of Critical Minerals

Five weeks of war in the Middle East have depleted U.S. missile defense systems in the region, forcing the military to rebuild interceptors that depend heavily on gallium — a metal China controls nearly exclusively. The supply shortage strengthens Beijing's negotiating position ahead of an upcoming summit between President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Iran's strikes on seven U.S. military sites damaged radar units and communications systems across the region, forcing the military to expend 10 or 11 interceptors to neutralize single incoming threats, according to analysis by the Payne Institute for Public Policy at the Colorado School of Mines. Rebuilding these systems will take years and require gallium, a critical mineral essential for accurate threat detection in missile interceptors.

China controls the processing of more than 90 percent of gallium and heavy rare earth metals like terbium and dysprosium — all key components in U.S. weapons systems. Gallium prices have already risen 32 percent in the past month, following months of lower prices that had prevailed since an October 30 agreement between the U.S. and China over critical mineral access. Mikhail Zeldovich, an investor focused on critical minerals, said the depletion "does make us more vulnerable. I don't think there's any doubt there."

Wendy Cutler, a former U.S. Trade Representative negotiator, warned that Beijing will exploit the situation. "The minute you look like a demander and there's things you want, then this relationship is at that point where the other side is smelling leverage," Cutler said. "And so Beijing can up their demands." Brian Hart, deputy director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, noted that supply disruptions create bottlenecks in defense industry production at a time when the sector already struggles to meet demand.

The White House stated that the Trump administration is pursuing a "robust, nimble, and multi-faceted strategy" to build alternative supply chains independent of China, including direct mining investments and international dealmaking. Last July, the Pentagon became the largest shareholder in MP Materials, which operates the only active rare earth mine in the United States, purchasing $400 million in preferred stock.

Context

The U.S. has long relied on China for critical mineral processing despite security concerns. In October 2025, China had restricted gallium exports, forcing the U.S. to negotiate a broader agreement on mineral access. That agreement temporarily stabilized prices, but the new military demand from Middle East operations has reversed those gains within six months.

The Pentagon's investment in MP Materials last July represented an early attempt to reduce China dependency, but the mine's output remains limited compared to global processing capacity. China controls more than 90 percent of heavy rare earth metal processing, a dominance built over decades through both investment and export restrictions on raw materials. The administration has requested $1.1 billion for a critical minerals office in the Department of Energy and directed the State Department to negotiate a plurilateral critical minerals trade agreement with multiple countries.

What's Next

A ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran announced Thursday night will allow military planners to assess damage and calculate rebuild timelines, likely spanning multiple years. This extended demand window gives Beijing leverage during the Trump-Xi summit, where critical minerals access will become a central negotiating point rather than a peripheral issue. The administration's stated commitment to supply chain independence will face a critical test: whether alternative sources and domestic production can scale fast enough to meet weapons rebuilding needs without capitulating to Chinese pricing demands.